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Abstract: According to complexity economics, a speculative bubble is a paradigmatic 
case of emergence which forms from individual behaviour. In order to provide a more 
detailed ontological investigation of this ‘lower level’, this paper aims to understand what 
a transaction is and how people actualize their financial choices. Given that selling and 
buying operations may involve just machines, it is argued that collective intentionality, at 
least in John Searle’s version, is not successful. It would seem, therefore, that the pivotal 
role is played by documents. The paper focuses mostly on the documents’ capacity to 
anchor quasi-abstract entities to reality and to attribute social and economic properties, 
such as property having a certain value. The latter is clearly involved in the emergence 
of a bubble.
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According to Wikipedia, a speculative bubble is ‘trade in an asset at a price or price range that strongly deviates from the corresponding asset’s intrinsic value’,1 and it usually occurs 
when, in a compressed period of time, many people decide to invest 
in a certain asset. Demand growth causes the boosting of prices. This 
fact induces new people to think that it is a very good deal and that it 
is profitable to invest in this asset; therefore, the price continues to rise 
and to deviate increasingly from the asset’s intrinsic value, namely the 
production cost. At this point, demand starts to decrease typically for 
two main reasons: the asset price is now too high and it does not attract 
new investors, while asset-holders try to sell it in order to collect the 
1 Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_bubble>
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capital gain. The consequence is a steep fall in asset price: the bubble 
is burst.
Undoubtedly, speculative bubbles belong to the social world. 
However, like other interesting social entities, such as the unemployment 
rate and Gross National Product, they are quite different from other 
social objects such as marriages, presidencies, and university degrees. 
The most evident difference is that, with respect to the former, one 
cannot say that they are constructed directly by human beings because 
the latter only detect them. At most, one may say that they are indirectly 
created by human being’s activities. A very interesting consequence 
is that, while it is true that ‘no realist would deny that VAT depends 
on conceptual schemes’,2 the same cannot be said about speculative 
bubbles. On one hand, they cannot exist regardless of us and our activities 
but, on the other hand, they are external to our conceptual schemes and 
may exist even though we ignore them. The first speculative bubble in 
the history, for instance, took place in The Netherlands in 1637: at that 
time, no one knew what a bubble was, yet it occurred anyway.
Something similar was also noticed by Jonathan Friedman. Referring 
to John Searle’s theory about the construction of the social reality, he 
argues that it leaves non-intentional properties of social life out and he 
provides the example of business cycles. They ‘are not institutions in 
practice, but they are systemic and they have crucial effects ... They are 
emergent properties of interaction over time.’3
What does ‘emergent properties’ mean? Broadly speaking, the 
concept of emergence is used to account for those circumstances in 
which there is an entity that arises from the interactions among parts. 
The latter are self-governing and their relations are not controlled by 
external agents. The emergent entity cannot be considered a mere sum 
of isolated parts but something novel and different compared to them.
Since a speculative bubble is a spontaneous process that occurs 
without any central intervention, and since it is supposed to be the result 
of people’s actions, reactions, and interactions, it is rather intuitive to 
rely on the concept of emergence in order to offer an explanation of it. 
Indeed, complexity economics, a field of research in which scholars 
2 M. Ferraris, Manifesto of new Realism (Albany, 2014), 35.
3 J. Friedman, ‘Comment on Searle’s ‘Social Ontology’: The Reality of the Imagination and 
the Cunning of the Non-Intentional’, anthropological theory, 6 (2006), 75.
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try to apply complexity science to economics, regards a speculative 
bubble as a paradigmatic example of emergence. According to Brian 
Arthur, ‘these aggregate patterns form from individual behaviour, and 
individual behaviour in turn responds to these aggregate patterns: 
there is a recursive loop. It is a recursive loop that connects with 
complexity.’4
Individual behaviour constitutes the lower level; it basically consists 
in buying and selling, namely the actions by means of which people give 
concrete expression to their beliefs and preferences. What is the best 
way to account for trade? What happens during a transaction? Without 
proper answers, it is not possible to provide a reliable explanation of 
speculative bubbles. This paper aims exactly to investigate trade’s 
nature and to put together a preliminary reflection about emergence, 
intentionality, and documents. 
Intentionality
John Searle is the author of the most popular theory about social 
ontology. In the Construction of Social Reality (1995) and in Making 
the Social World (2010), he provides a fascinating explanation of the 
ways in which we construct institutional facts such as money, elections, 
and marriages. 
In the first book, Searle accounts for the creation of social objects 
by considering three fundamental elements: the assignment of function, 
collective intentionality, and constitutive rules. 
Humans beings, but also other animals, have the capacity to impose 
functions on objects. Sometimes, functions cannot be carried out simply 
by objects’ physical properties but in virtue of the fact that individuals 
acknowledge those objects as having a new status. These functions are 
called status functions. 
What allows the assignment of function is the intentionality: according 
to Franz Brentano, our mental states, such as beliefs and desires, have the 
property of being intentional, of being directed at an object. In Searle’s 
opinion, intentionality may be individual but also collective:
4 W.B. Arthur, Complexity and the Economy (New York, 2015), 3.
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The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, 
etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived 
from the collective intentionality that they share. Thus, to go back to the earlier example 
of the football game, I do indeed have a singular intention to block the defensive end, 
but I have that intention only as part of our collective intention to execute a pass play.5
The last element to consider is the constitutive rule which has the 
following form: X counts as y in C, a physical object counts as a social 
object in a certain context. 
In order to explain how these three elements work together, Searle 
often resorts to the example of banknotes: by means of collective 
intentionality, we acknowledge that, in a certain context some pieces of 
paper have a new status, the status of banknotes. In accordance to this 
new status, these pieces of paper can carry out some functions, e.g. the 
function to be used as a medium of exchange. 
In Making the Social World, Searle proposes a new and more general 
theory in which the creation of the social reality is explained by means 
of particular types of declarations called Status Function Declarations: 
‘in such cases language enables us to create a reality by representing 
that reality as existing’.6 They have this general form: we make it the 
case by declaration that the y status function exists. One can see that 
this formulation does not require necessarily an X term, a physical 
object; therefore this approach has the benefit of accounting for the 
so-called free-standing y terms. Indeed, as Barry Smith7 notices, some 
social objects, such as debts, do not have a physical form, there is not a 
physical object that becomes a debt. 
Declarations can be formulated in different ways according to the 
type of institutional fact in question. Therefore, X counts as Y in C is 
only one kind of Status Function Declaration, but there are many other 
types. This allows them to adapt to the social reality’s complexity. 
In this new account, collective intentionality also plays a crucial 
role, and Searle provides a more detailed examination of it. According 
to him, there are two forms of collective intentionality: cooperation 
5 J. Searle, the Construction of Social Reality (New York, 1995), 24–5.
6 Id., Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization (New York, 2010), 68.
7 B. Smith, ‘Un’aporia nella costruzione della realtà sociale. Naturalismo e realismo in John 
R. Searle’, in Paolo Di Lucia (ed.), ontologia Sociale (Macerata, 2003), 137–52.
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and collective recognition.8 The creation of an institution, such as the 
institution of money, and the acts within an institution, such as buying 
and selling within the institution of money, require cooperation. People 
cooperate when each member of the group believes that other people 
have an intention-in-action of the same form as his. Put another way, each 
member of the group must believe that there is a common goal and that 
each individual contributes to the achievement of that goal by means of 
singular actions. The existence of an institution, on the contrary, requires 
only a collective recognition, namely the sharing of some beliefs, such as 
the belief that pieces of paper with specific characteristics are banknotes.
At this point the question is whether such an approach can help 
to account for trade and thus for the connection between trade and 
speculative bubbles. Unfortunately, it would appear not. By claiming 
that acts within an institution require cooperation and collective 
recognition, hence collective intentionality, Searle takes it for granted 
that a transaction occurs always between human beings. 
However, there are two interesting counter-examples. The first 
regards E-commerce, a form of trade that allows us to sell and buy 
online. In this case, transactions occur between a human being and a 
piece of software: the former has intentionality, the latter does not have 
it. Therefore, there is neither cooperation nor collective recognition. 
The second counter-example is more extreme and regards automated 
trading systems. They are computer programs that, by following a 
defined set of instructions, do what human traders usually do, namely 
buy and sell securities. According to Wikipedia, ‘as of 2014, more 
than 75 per cent of the stock shares traded on United States exchanges 
(including the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) originate 
from automated trading system orders’.9 Also this case shows that some 
transactions may occur between a human being and a program, but 
only the former has intentionality. Most importantly, this case shows 
that some transactions may even occur between two automated trading 
systems; in this case there is no intentionality at all. At this point, it 
would seem that there are two alternatives: either accept that acts within 
an institution do not necessarily require collective intentionality or 
argue that machines possess intentionality.
8 J. Searle, Making the Social World, 42–60.
9 Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_trading_system>
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The first option appears to be much more feasible, but one has 
to recognize the fundamental role played by traces. Searle does not 
completely overlook them; indeed, in his opinion the creation of 
complex entities such us a corporation requires ‘an elaborate set of 
written constitutive rules … and an elaborated written record of the 
activities of the corporation’.10
Nevertheless, in an effort to provide an explanation of all forms of 
trade, not only those between human beings, one may go further and 
provide a more detailed analysis of this ‘written record’.
Documents
An interesting alternative to Searle’s approach is the theory drafted by 
Maurizio Ferraris in Documentality (2009). In Ferraris’ opinion, it is 
possible to account for the construction of the social world by means 
of a simple rule: object = inscribed act. A social object is an act that 
involves at least two people; this act is inscribed in a document, in a 
computer file or in people’s mind.11
The law Object = Inscribed Act is omnipresent in social reality, and can be articulated 
in two ways, one strong and the other weak. The strong or literal version has to do with 
the construction of documents within an institutional reality. Here we have genuine 
writing at work ... Then there is a broader and weaker understanding that concerns 
the construction of social objects; in this zone, we take in forms of inscription that 
are not identified with writing in the full sense – from marking a territory to making a 
mental note to performing a ritual – but that in point of fact fall within the sphere of 
what Derrida called ‘archiwriting’.12
Hence, a transaction would consist in an act that involves a buyer 
and a seller and is inscribed in a document. One may wonder whether 
Ferraris’ rule is able to account for transactions that involve machines. 
The answer seems to be positive. Elsewhere, Ferraris himself specifies 
that a social act may ‘involve at least two people, or a delegated machine 
10 J. Searle, Making The Social World, 98–9.
11 M. Ferraris, Documentality. Why it is necessary to leave traces (New York, 2014), 159.
12 Ibid., 206.
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and a person’.13 Moreover, whereas his theory does not require that 
intentionality has to be present during each act (indeed, it plays a minor 
role in the construction of social objects),14 it is possible to advance 
still further and claim that a social act may involve just machines. The 
key word is delegated. By means of a delegation, a person allocates to 
someone else the power to do something. Nowadays, we constantly 
delegate machines to carry out tasks for us; therefore it is no surprise 
that, among these responsibilities, there is the creation of social entities. 
In summary, one may say that a social entity such as a transaction 
arises when three conditions are satisfied. First, there must be a social 
act that involves at least two agents (people or delegated machines). 
Second, this act must be inscribed in a material support. Third, in 
order to be binding, the act and the inscription must be executed in 
accordance to the institution’s rules, namely the system to which they 
belong. In Italy, for instance, a real-estate transaction may occur only in 
the presence of a notary, otherwise it is not legal. 
It is now clear that, in the creation of institutional entities and 
therefore in economic transactions, documents are pivotal, whereas 
intentionality, in some cases, may be even absent. With regard to 
intentionality, as Giuliano Torrengo points out, one may simply think 
that ‘the only relevant shared intention in an institutional context for 
the existence of institutional entities is that of deferring to established 
procedure as to what contents are socially binding, namely, as to what 
grounds facts about institutional reality’.15
Barry Smith recognizes the significance of documents; however, he 
maintains a different position from Ferraris. As has been mentioned 
in the second paragraph, according to Smith, the constitutive rule 
proposed by Searle, X counts as y in C, is flawed. Indeed, in the case 
of social entities such as debts, financial instruments, or rights, ‘there 
is no physical X term to which the corresponding properties or powers 
could be ascribed’.16 Smith terms these particular social entities quasi-
13 Id., ‘New Realism, Documentality and the Emergence of Normativity’, in  Fabio Bacchini 
– Stefano Caputo – Massimo Dell’Utri  (eds.), Realism and ontology Without Myths (New-
castle, 2014), 114.
14 M. Ferraris, anima e ipad, ed. Ugo Guanda (Parma, 2011), 90–1.
15 G. Torrengo, ‘Institutional Externalism’, philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47 (2017), 83–4.
16 B Smith, ‘Searle and de Soto: The New Ontology of the Social World’, in Smith-Mark-
Ehrlich (eds.), the Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality (Chicago, 
2008), 39.
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abstract entities: on one hand, they are both non-physical and non-
psychological, but on the other hand, unlike standard abstract entities 
(e.g. numbers), they are historical: they exist in time.17
Even though a debt does not have an X term, it is still linked to the 
physical reality, more specifically it is anchored ‘in the realm of records 
and representations’.18 It means that ‘debts depend for their existence 
on representations, which may enjoy a merely ephemeral existence in 
the form of memory traces, or which may be transformed into enduring 
representations by being written down’.19 It is important to notice that, 
albeit a debt is linked to a document, the latter only represents the debt. 
Consequentially, the document neither counts as the debt, nor is the 
debt the document. 
Both Smith and Searle, hence, claim that the social reality is 
partially constituted by non-physical entities. The same perspective is 
also confirmed by the economist Hernando de Soto. In the Mistery of 
Capital (2000), he argues that the capacity of an asset to create wealth, 
and therefore to become live capital, depends on formal property 
systems. In the countries where these systems are absent, such as the 
former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Latin America, houses are 
simply shelters. On the contrary, in the West, houses have a parallel 
life as capital outside the physical world. They are live capital; indeed, 
for instance, they may be used as collateral for a loan by which it is 
possible to start or expand a business and thus create wealth.20
The following passage, that is often cited by both Smith and Ferraris, 
elucidates the point:
Capital is born by representing in writing – in a title, a security, a contract and other 
such records – the most economically and socially useful qualities about the asset, as 
opposed to the visually more striking aspects of the asset. This is where potential value 
is first described and registered. The moment you focus your attention on the title of a 
house, for example, and not on the house itself, you have automatically stepped from 
the material world into the conceptual universe where capital lives.21
17 Ibid., 37.
18 Ibid., 44.
19 Ibid., 39.
20 H. de Soto, the Mystery of Capital. Why Capitalism triumphs in the West and Fails Every-
where Else (New York, 2000), 36–7.
21 Ibid., 48.
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De Soto, like Smith, uses the verb to represent; however, there is a 
relevant difference. According to Smith,22 a marriage license, namely a 
document, allows the creation of a bond of matrimony. The latter is a 
quasi-abstract entity and, as such, it is anchored to the document. The 
marriage license represents the bond of matrimony. According to de 
Soto, a document represents an asset’s qualities but these qualities are 
not anchored to the document; they are rather anchored to the asset itself 
by means of that document. It would seem, therefore, that qualities are 
attributed, not represented. Consider this simple case. Carlotta has just 
graduated with a degree in veterinary science. Her diploma allows the 
existence of some quasi-abstract entities, such as a qualification, and 
the latter is anchored to the document. In addition, on the document, 
some social properties are specified. Some of them, such as name, 
surname, date of birth, and so on, belong already to Carlotta; these 
types of properties are only proposed again by the document in order 
to specify her identity. Other properties, such as the property of being 
graduated, are attributed to Carlotta by means of that very document. In 
these cases, there is no representation of properties.
Now, let us get back to speculative bubbles and in particular to 
a real-estate bubble. At the lower level, people sell and buy houses. 
Transactions occur by means of documents, specifically property 
contracts. The latter are the physical objects to which some quasi-
abstract entities, such as property rights, are anchored. Moreover, 
contracts attribute some properties to people involved: the buyer, for 
instance, acquires the property of being the owner. Contracts attribute 
some properties also to assets, namely the houses, such as the property 
of having a certain value. The crucial point is that the first property may 
be permanent: the owner ceases to be an owner only if he decides to 
sell the house. On the contrary, the property of having a certain value 
is unstable, it may change continuously, irrespective of our will. This 
difference is due to the fact that the property of having a certain value is 
involved in the loop associated with complexity of which Brian Arthur 
speaks. People actualize their behaviour by signing documents, these 
documents attribute a certain value to assets, this value affects the 
market trend, the latter, in turn, affects people’s behaviour, and so on.
22 B. Smith, ‘Document Acts’, in Anita Konzelmann Ziv – Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), institu-
tions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology (Dordrecht, 2014), 22.
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Conclusion
There are good reasons to think that a speculative bubble is an emergent 
entity. It is usually regarded as the outcome of agents’ behaviour that is 
actualized by means of buying and selling operations. Since transactions 
may occur even between two delegated machines, such as automated 
trading systems, in order to provide an adequate account of the lower 
level from which a bubble arises, the essential element to consider is not 
the intentionality, but rather the document. On one hand, it allows the 
anchorage of quasi-abstract entities: property right, for instance, is not 
a physical entity, therefore it needs to bind to a material object, namely 
a document. On the other hand, this paper has argued that a document 
also has the function to attribute properties to people and assets, such 
as the property of having a certain value. The latter is particularly 
important in so far as it is one of the most important property involved 
in the existence of a bubble. 
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